Welcome!
I am currently a Senior Research Associate with ACLED, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project. I received my PhD from Emory University in 2021 and previously held fellowships with the Center for Security and Conflict Studies at George Washington University.
I am a scholar of conflict and peacekeeping operations. My research interests include United Nations peace operations, conflict dynamics, violence against civilians, and more. I am particularly interested in the relationship between peacekeepers and political actors, and how their interactions shape the nature of the conflict and post-conflict settings in which peacekeepers operate.
My dissertation focused on the strategic subnational location of United Nations peacekeepers, and how that placement shapes their ability to protect civilians from violence. I argued that the need for consent gives host governments the incentive and access to influence operations. However, in civil conflicts, non-state actors do not have this ability. This asymmetrical access pushes operations towards the preferences of the host government. I tested my theory using data on the subnational location of United Nations bases in African civil conflicts from 2000 to 2015.
You can contact me via my Emory University email, danielle.villa [at] emory [dot] edu.
I am currently a Senior Research Associate with ACLED, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project. I received my PhD from Emory University in 2021 and previously held fellowships with the Center for Security and Conflict Studies at George Washington University.
I am a scholar of conflict and peacekeeping operations. My research interests include United Nations peace operations, conflict dynamics, violence against civilians, and more. I am particularly interested in the relationship between peacekeepers and political actors, and how their interactions shape the nature of the conflict and post-conflict settings in which peacekeepers operate.
My dissertation focused on the strategic subnational location of United Nations peacekeepers, and how that placement shapes their ability to protect civilians from violence. I argued that the need for consent gives host governments the incentive and access to influence operations. However, in civil conflicts, non-state actors do not have this ability. This asymmetrical access pushes operations towards the preferences of the host government. I tested my theory using data on the subnational location of United Nations bases in African civil conflicts from 2000 to 2015.
You can contact me via my Emory University email, danielle.villa [at] emory [dot] edu.